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Abstract
We consider alternative explanations for variation in voter turnout rates across 
the five countries in Southeast Asia that the Polity IV database suggests are 
most “democratic.” Research on voter turnout in Western states has typically 
drawn connections between institutional, demographic, political, and 
economic variables and turnout levels. In this essay, we test each group of 
predictors and attempt to begin the process of isolating the factors that are 
most relevant to electoral participation in Southeast Asia. The research finds 
that many traditional explanations for voter turnout are inadequate. Yet, high-
quality formal democracy, combined with poor economic conditions, can 
reasonably predict voter turnout in the countries studied. In the end, the research 
qualifies our results in an attempt to prompt a more thorough discussion and 
understanding of democratization in the region.
Keywords:  Southeast Asian politics, voter turnout, election laws, political 
corruption.
 
Southeast Asia has been viewed as exceptional in the developing world in 
terms of economic growth and economic potential. This has caused increased 
attention to the region and concern with government stability and democratic 
potential. Political science has rediscovered Southeast Asia in recent years for 
several reasons. First, the variance of regime types within a relatively confined 
geographical area has provided scholars with opportunities to generate new 
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hypotheses about democratization and to elaborate on existing ones.1 Second, 
some of the most dramatic regime changes of recent years have occurred 
in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, for instance, has become the world’s third 
largest democracy within just a decade. Likewise, political events related to 
democratization in Malaysia and Thailand have made world headlines on 
several occasions in recent years. Third, home to nearly half a billion people, 
the sheer number of people living in Southeast Asia makes it a region hard to 
ignore.
Our study explores the determinants of voter turnout in the five countries in 
Southeast Asia that the Polity IV database suggests are the most “democratic” 
in the region, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. We do not examine voter turnout in the nation-states of the region 
where democracy and electoral activity are less well-developed for several 
reasons: these cases are likely anomalous; accurate data are less available; and 
theory is currently too underdeveloped to prompt meaningful cross-national 
empirical tests. Participation is intimately linked to the concept of democracy.2 
Therefore, studying voter turnout may offer considerable insight into the state 
of democracy across Southeast Asia. For instance, other scholars suggest 
that low voter turnout can be seen as evidence of less support for the state, 
particularly in countries undergoing democratic transition.3 Moreover, the act 
of voting as a form of political participation is commonly associated with the 
degree to which policy outcomes represent citizen preferences.4 Still further, 
voter turnout is often used as a yardstick for democratic “progress” in old and 
new democracies as well as in democracies “in the making,” as Southeast 
Asian countries often are characterized.5
Furthermore, we are motivated by a lack of systematic examination of 
democratic development in Southeast Asia and by the belief that the regional 
application of models of voter turnout in cultural contexts other than the 
Western industrial world enriches our understanding of citizen participation, 
generally. The political environment in which elections are held in the five 
countries studied has changed considerably in recent decades. The emergence 
of relatively independent middle classes in the context of rapid economic 
1 Erik M. Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu, Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, 
and Qualitative Analysis (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 25.
2 Arend Lijphart, “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unsolved Dilemma, Presidential Address, 
American Political Science Association, 1996,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 1 
(1997): 1-14.
3 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet 
Union, and Yugoslavia,” Daedalus 121, no. 2 (1992): 123-139.
4 James G. Gimpel and Jason E. Schuknecht, “Political Participation and the Accessibility of the 
Ballot Box,” Political Geography 29, no. 5 (2003): 5-17, and Lijphart, “Unequal Participation.”
5 Tatiana Kostadinova and Timothy J. Power, “Does Democratization Depress Participation?: 
Voter Turnout in the Latin American and Eastern European Transitional Democracies,” Political 
Research Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2007): 363-377.
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growth;6 a mass media that is more difficult to control; and an international 
environment that since the demise of the Cold War is more willing to shun 
military dictatorships and emphasize transparency and accountability7 have 
all democratized these polities to varying degrees independent from the 
introduction of competitive elections. Elections have acquired new meaning 
as a consequence.
We approached our research question in full awareness of the many 
democratic deficits in the region. Moreover, there is no pretension that we 
have developed a comprehensive story about all the factors that influence voter 
turnout in the region, let alone all the factors that contribute to the quality 
of democratic governance in the nation-states we study. However, we forge 
forward in an effort to begin to unravel possible causal relations between a 
host of variables and voter turnout to initiate a discussion of cross-national 
correlates. We then scrutinize our discoveries, assessing critically the correlates 
uncovered in the last section of this essay. Our examination of the dynamics of 
voter turnout in the region is incomplete. But, we are motivated by the scarcity 
of research which explicitly addresses the issue of voter participation rates, 
from a comparative perspective, in the region’s political settings that are more 
self-governing than others.
Models of Voting Turnout
Electoral institutions, demographic considerations,8 the quality of democracy,9 
and economic factors10 have all been tied to cross-national variation in voter 
6 John T. Sidel, “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Revisited: Colonial State and 
Chinese Immigrant in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia,” Comparative Politics 40, no. 2 
(2008): 127-147.
7 Mushtaq Khan, “Rent-Seeking as Process,” in Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: 
Theory and Evidence in Asia, ed. Mushtaq Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 70-144.
8 Mark N. Franklin, “Electoral Participation,” in Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting 
in Global Perspective, ed. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Gene Niemi, and Pippa Norris (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996), 216-235; Harold F. Gosnell, Why Europe Votes (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1930); and Herbert Tingsten, Political Behavior: Studies in 
Election Statistics (London: P. S. King and Son, 1937).
9 Roger Scully, Richard Wyn Jones, and Dafydd Trystan, “Turnout, Participation and Legitimacy 
in Post-Devolution Wales,” British Journal of Political Science 34, no. 3 (2004): 519-537; 
Kostadinova and Power, “Does Democratization Depress Participation?”; and Daniel A. Smith, 
“Consolidating Democracy: The Structural Underpinnings of Ghana’s 2000 Elections,” Journal 
of Modern African Studies 40, no. 4 (2002): 621-650.
10 James H. Fowler and Cindy D. Kam, “Patience as a Political Virtue: Delayed Gratification and 
Turnout,” Political Behavior 28, no. 2 (2006): 113-128; Gopal Krishna, “Electoral Participation 
and Political Integration,” Economic and Political Weekly 2, nos. 3/5 (1967): 179-190; and 
Alexander C. Pacek, “Macroeconomics: Conditions and Electoral Politics in East Central 
Europe,” American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 3 (1994): 723-744.
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turnout. Originally, voter turnout models were developed and applied to 
Western industrial democracies;11 consequently, less is understood about the 
relationship between these factors and voter turnout in different regions of 
the world. In analyses of non-Western cases, the results have been mixed, and 
there has been minimal discussion regarding the disparate effects expected 
and found. To illustrate, high unemployment has been a mobilizing factor 
in certain countries, but in other instances, high unemployment, perhaps 
indicative of economic deprivation, has been associated with lower electoral 
participation.12
We begin with a brief theoretical discussion specific to the region and 
follow this with empirical tests of the relationship between turnout and some 
conventional variables. Unfortunately, a small sample size challenges our 
empirical analysis. Because our intention is to initiate a generalized discussion, 
we are not satisfied by a simple case-study approach of only one or two 
countries. But, even when examining five countries, there still is not a sufficient 
number of elections to conduct meaningful multivariate testing. In the end, we 
base our analysis on an original dataset of nineteen parliamentary elections 
that took place in the five countries from 1998 through 2011. The analysis is 
limited to the most recent time period because of inconsistent experiences with 
democratic elections prior to 1998. The nineteen cases do afford an opportunity 
to perform crosstab analyses, of the type that often leads to more significant 
quantitative work in the future. We hope to be able to expand on the analysis as 
the number of democratic elections in the region grows. For now, our intention 
is to begin to test the external validity of some traditional variables used to 
explain cross-national variation in voter turnout rates.
The Southeast Asian Context
One of Southeast Asia’s unique features is the region’s institutional, 
demographic, political, and economic diversity. A turbulent history accounts for 
variegated patterns of state formation across the region and the emergence of 
political systems whose institutional arrangements differ in important ways.13 
11 Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, “The Not So Simple Act of Voting,” in Political 
Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. Ada Finifter (Washington, DC: American Political 
Science Association, 1993): 193-218; Franklin, “Electoral Participation”; Robert W. Jackman, 
“Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies,” American Political 
Science Review 81, no. 2 (1987): 405-423; Lijphart, “Unequal Participation”; and G. Bingham 
Powell, Jr., “American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective,” American Political Science 
Review 80, no. 1 (1986): 17-43.
12 Robert A. Jackson, “Differential Influences on Latino Electoral Participation,” Political 
Behavior 25, no. 4 (2003): 339-466, and Steven J. Rosenstone, “Economic Adversity and Voter 
Turnout,” American Journal of Poltical Science 26, no. 1 (1982): 25-46.
13 Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast 
Asia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 55-114.
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The region is also a cultural mosaic where some of the world’s most ethnically 
and religiously diverse countries are located.14 Finally, rapid urbanization and 
the emergence of capitalist classes with distinct identities and strengths are 
indicative of the region’s dramatic economic changes over past decades.15
With all the socio-political and economic diversity, the task of ascertaining 
valid generalizations is substantial. Yet, the regional focus provides an 
opportunity to hold some factors constant that could be inadvertently excluded 
due to measurement limitations or theoretical deficiencies. Moreover, we 
do not claim there is no variation in those factors, assumed constant, across 
Southeast Asian nation-states. However, we would expect this variation to 
be substantially smaller than between Southeast Asian states and Western 
industrialized cases or even between nation-states in other parts of Asia.
Two characteristics of the politics in Southeast Asia are worth emphasizing. 
The region as a whole showed signs of democratization relatively late 
compared to the rest of the world. Watershed events occurred toward the end 
of the third wave of democratization, including the demise of President Marcos 
in the Philippines in 1986, the implementation of the People’s Constitution 
in Thailand in 1997, and the fall of President Suharto in Indonesia in 1998. 
The relative novelty of these democratic accomplishments may have a positive 
influence on citizens’ attitudes toward newly gained political freedoms. Hence, 
we speculate that civil and political liberties will have a measurable influence 
on voter turnout values.
In addition, the region shows an interesting anomaly with regard to 
Lipset’s observation about the correlation between a nation’s affluence and its 
propensity to establish a democratic political system.16 Lipset’s hypothesis, 
which has seen a revival of sorts in political science in recent years,17 does not 
hold true in Southeast Asia. Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore are the region’s 
most affluent countries but also less democratic than poorer Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand, causing comparativists to label these latter 
countries “electoral overachievers.”18 We would therefore expect anomalous 
relationships between economic affluence and voter turnout. In other words, 
electoral participation should be higher in poor countries.
14 Susan J. Henders, Democratization and Identity: Regimes and Ethnicity in East and Southeast 
Asia (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004).
15 Sidel, “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Revisited.”
16 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105. 
17 Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction,” in 
Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, 
ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 1-49.
18 Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, “An ‘Arab’ More than a ‘Muslim’ Electoral Gap,” 
Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (2003): 30-44. 
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Empirical Tests
The dependent variable in this research is the proportion of the voting-age 
population that casts votes in parliamentary elections. Much previous work 
that mentions electoral participation in Southeast Asia has looked at turnout of 
registered voters;19 however, this manipulation prevents any test of the effect 
that automatic voter registration (as occurs in Indonesia) might have on voter 
turnout. Moreover, there are voting irregularities in Singapore,20 where during 
the three most recent national elections only a little more than 39 percent of the 
voting-age population was registered to vote. If we studied only voting turnout 
of registered voters, we would misrepresent the level of electoral participation 
occurring in Singapore.
Table 1 shows the election years, countries, voter turnout in each election, 
and the average turnout in each country for the time period of the study. 
The table shows that Indonesia has experienced the highest level of citizen 
electoral participation (81.9 percent) and Singapore the lowest level of voter 
turnout (36.9 percent). Turnout values for the nineteen elections cluster nicely 
by country, albeit not perfectly. The research now turns to isolating possible 
systematic influences on the country average values.
Institutional Considerations
We begin by examining how certain electoral/institutional arrangements 
may affect turnout in democratizing Southeast Asia. Our first institutional 
consideration is rest-day voting. Seemingly, the ability to vote on a traditional 
non-workday would be associated with an increase in voter turnout. However, 
some studies have suggested that rest-day voting does not significantly affect 
electoral participation.21 Rest-day voting occurs in Thailand and Singapore.
Second, we test the effect of concurrent elections or elections when a 
chief executive and the legislature are chosen at the same time. Concurrence 
is believed to enhance the level of electoral relevance of a parliamentary 
election22 and consequently to produce higher voter turnout. In the five 
19 Chin-Huat Wong, “The Federal and State Elections in Malaysia, March 2004,” Electoral 
Studies 24, no. 2 (2005): 311-319; James Chin, “The General Election in Singapore, May 
2006,” Electoral Studies 26, no. 3 (2007): 703-707; Graham K. Brown, “Federal and State 
Elections in Malaysia,” Electoral Studies 27, no. 4 (2008): 740-744; and Christian Schafferer, 
“The Parliamentary Election in Thailand, December 2007,” Electoral Studies 28, no. 1 (2009): 
167-170.
20 Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994).
21 Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler, Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and Their 
Political Consequences (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
22 Kostadinova and Power, “Does Democratization Depress Participation?” and Franklin, 
“Electoral Participation.”
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Table 1.Turnout of Voting-Age Population  
in Five Southeast Asian Countries, 1998-2011
Year Country Turnout Average Turnout
1999 Indonesia 85.7 81.9
2004 Indonesia 87.5
2009 Indonesia 74.0
1999 Malaysia 49.6 51.8
2004 Malaysia 52.2
2008 Malaysia 53.4
1998 Philippines 69.0 65.0
2001 Philippines 64.7
2004 Philippines 75.1
2007 Philippines 54.9
2010 Philippines 63.1
2001 Singapore 21.4 36.9
2006 Singapore 32.2
2011 Singapore 53.3
2001 Thailand 70.1 69.7
2005 Thailand 73.5
2006 Thailand 62.6
2007 Thailand 76.2
2011 Thailand 66.0
Note: Elections are in chronological order within the alphabetical order of countries.
countries analyzed here, only the Philippines has concurrent parliamentary and 
presidential elections.
Third, we seek to determine how unicameral legislatures may affect 
voters’ perceptions of their own efficacy and the policy prowess of the 
government officials whom they elect. Voters’ perceptions of the decisiveness 
of elections for policymaking has been linked to voting turnout,23 and it is 
argued that voter turnout is higher the “greater the power that is bestowed on 
those elected.”24 In other words, when one’s vote is more likely to make a 
difference, citizens should turn out at a higher rate. In 1999, the parliamentary 
election in Indonesia was for a unicameral legislature, and Singapore has had 
a unicameral legislature throughout the time period studied.
Fourth, mandatory voting is expected to lead to higher voter turnout rates. 
What is most interesting about this variable in other regions is that it does 
23 Jackman, “Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies,” and Andre 
Blais, To Vote or Not To Vote? (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
24 Blais, To Vote or Not To Vote?
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not seem to matter whether the country actually enforces the law or provides 
punitive sanctions for nonvoting.25 Once voting is made mandatory, people 
tend to follow the rule. This suggests higher voter turnout in elections where 
voting is compulsory, as is the cases in Singapore and Thailand.
Last, we test automatic registration, or its reverse, voter registration by 
personal initiative. When registration is not automatic, citizens wishing to vote, 
in effect, need to turn out twice-once to register and again to cast a vote. It is 
widely acknowledged that difficult voter registration requirements sap voter 
turnout among the voting-age population.26 Building on existing literature, our 
expectation is that voter turnout will be lower where voter registration laws 
demand that voters take the initiative to register and remain registered. In this 
analysis, only Indonesia has an automatic voter registration process, albeit one 
marred by problems sufficient to warrant further discussion when we turn to 
qualifying our results below.
Demographic Considerations
We use female literacy as a proxy for the health of a nation’s education 
system. Arguably, higher literacy is evidence of a more educated population. 
We use female literacy because suffrage was universal in the nation-states of 
Southeast Asia during the time period of this study and because it provides 
greater variation in this proxy for educational achievement. The average rate of 
women’s literacy in our sample of nations is 89.3 percent and ranges from 85.4 
percent in Malaysia to 92.7 percent in the Philippines. We anticipate a positive 
relationship between literacy and voter turnout.
Urbanization may be associated with increased poverty and low levels 
of political mobilization by virtue of economic deprivation.27 However, it is 
also possible that urbanization may allow for more assessable polling stations 
and give voters greater access to political information, which may enable 
political parties to better mobilize their constituents.28 Although the theoretical 
expectations are somewhat mixed, the urbanization and poverty argument is 
more relevant to developed industrial democracies and the ease of polling 
argument is more pertinent to nation-states still in the process of democratic 
and economic development. Hence, in our analysis, we expect urbanization to 
25 Lijphart, “Unequal Participation,” and Tingsten, Political Behavior.
26 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Why Americans Still Don’t Vote: And Why 
Politicians Want It That Way (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Ruy A. 
Teixeira, The Disappearing American Voter (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1992); and 
Richard E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, Who Votes? (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1980).
27 Franklin D. Gilliam, “Influences on Voter Turnout for U. S. House Elections in Non-Presidential 
Years,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 10, no. 3 (1985): 339-351, and Robert A. Jackson, “A 
Reassessment of Voter Mobilization,” Political Research Quarterly 49, no. 2 (1996): 331-349.
28 Carolina A. Fornos, Timothy J. Power, and James C. Garand, “Explaining Voter Turnout in 
Latin American, 1980 to 2000,” Comparative Political Studies 37 (2004): 909-940.
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be associated with increased voter turnout. The average rate of urbanization in 
the five countries we are studying is a little over 51 percent and ranges from 
100 percent in Singapore to 34 percent in Thailand.
The size of the largest ethnic group serves as an indicator of ethnic 
pluralism. It is widely recognized that ethnic cleavages can produce greater 
citizen participation in democracies.29 Hence, in countries such as Singapore, 
where the Chinese majority constitutes 76.8 percent of the population and the 
largest ethnic group, ethnic tension may be reduced and there may be consequent 
lower voter turnout. The Philippines, on the other hand, has significant ethnic 
diversity. The Tagalog are the largest ethnic group, yet account for only 28.1 
percent of the population. Consequently, we might expect greater ethnic-based 
voter mobilization efforts and higher voter turnout in the Philippines.
We also check the size of the largest religious group to see if religious 
pluralism may be causing social cleavages that would prompt voter mobilization 
in the same manner that ethnic cleavage is hypothesized to do.30 Thailand is 94.6 
percent Buddhist, therefore we might expect less religious-based mobilization 
and lower voter turnout. On the other hand, more significant religious-based 
mobilization may take place in Singapore where Buddhist are again the largest 
religious group but represent only 42.5 percent of the total population. The size 
of the largest religious group should be inversely related to voter turnout.
Democratic Development
Next, we examine how democratic development may affect voter turnout in our 
five nation-states. We focus on four measures of the quality of democracy. In the 
literature, the level of democracy is commonly associated with voter turnout.31 
Accordingly, political repression discourages democratic participation and 
places restrictions on meaningful electoral competition. We hypothesize that 
the higher the risks of casting a vote and the more widespread the official 
manipulation of elections, the lower turnout will be. In our analysis, we use the 
widely publicized annual Freedom House rating of civil liberties and political 
rights to account for the level of democracy. We also combine these scores 
29 Serguei Kaniovski and Dennis C. Mueller, “Community Size, Heterogeneity and Voter 
Turnouts,” Public Choice 129, nos. 3/4 (2006): 339-415; Bill Winders, “The Roller Coaster of 
Class Conflict: Class Segments, Mass Mobilization, and Voter Turnout in the U. S., 1840-1996,” 
Social Forces 77, no. 3 (1999): 833-862; and Carole J. Uhlaner, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick 
Kiewiet, “Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s,” Political Behavior 11, no. 3 
(1989): 195-231.
30 M. Reza Nakhaie, “Electoral Participation in Municipal, Provincial and Federal Elections in 
Canada,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (2006): 363-390; Gary G. Preuss, 
“The Effects of Density and Urban Residence on Voter Turnout,” Population and Environment 
4, no. 4 (1981): 246-265; and Theodore F. Macaluso and John Wanat, “Voting Turnout and 
Religiosity,” Polity 12, no. 1 (1979): 158-169.
31 Blais, To Vote or Not To Vote? and Kostadinova and Power, “Does Democratization Depress 
Participation?”
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to develop a third measure of democratic development and add the Polity IV 
Index as a fourth measure. The Polity IV Index has been used routinely in 
cross-national tests of democratic performance.32
Using the Freedom House civil liberties and Freedom House political 
rights indicators, each country is ranked on a scale of one to seven. A score 
of one on either indicator represents the highest level of civil liberties or civil 
rights, while a score of seven indicates the lowest level. In our database, the 
Philippines has the best record on civil liberties and Singapore and Malaysia 
are tied for the worst record during the time period studied. Concerning civil 
rights, Indonesia has the best formal civil rights record and Singapore the 
worst. The Freedom House combined scores yield a scale that ranges from 
two to fourteen, with a score of “2” indicating the highest possible level of 
freedoms and rights. Because a higher combined Freedom House score is a 
well-established measure of repression, we anticipate a negative association 
with voter turnout. Using average values across all election years in our 
dataset, Indonesia has the lowest combined score (highest quality democracy) 
and Singapore the highest combined score (lowest quality democracy).
Polity scores have been used to place countries on a twenty-one-point scale 
that ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).33 
With this measure, higher scores indicate better quality democracy and the 
Philippines (8) has the highest score, followed closely by Indonesia (7.33). In 
our dataset, Singapore again ranks the lowest of the five countries in terms of 
democratic development.
Economic Considerations
In early analyses of Western industrial democracies, economic development 
and wealth are found to be positively associated with voter turnout at both 
the individual and aggregate levels of analysis.34 However, in other contexts, 
scholars have found that poor economic conditions can cause citizen 
mobilization. In particular, a study of voter turnout in Latin American found 
that poor economic conditions are associated with higher voter turnout.35
32 Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Håvard Strand, “Institutional Inconsistency 
and Political Instiability: Polity Duration, 1800-2000,” American Journal of Political Science 
50, no. 4 (2006): 893-908, and Shawn Treier and Simon Jackman, “Democracy as a Latent 
Variable,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2008): 201-217.
33 These scores can be separated into the three following categories: autocracies (-10 to 6); 
anocracies (-5 to +5); and democracies (+6 to +10).
34 G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), and John E. Filer, Lawrence W. Kenny, 
and Rebecca B. Morton, “Redistribution, Income and Voting,” American Journal of Political 
Science 37, no. 1 (1993): 63-87.
35 Scot Schraufnagel and Barbara Sgouraki, “Voter Turnout in Central and South American,” Latin 
Americanist 49, no. 1 (2005): 39-69.
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In this analysis of Southeast Asian countries, expectations regarding 
economic factors are mixed. On the one hand, we know severe economic 
deprivation can mean political mobilization is impossible. On the other hand, 
if the quality of democracy is sufficient enough so that the poor feel their 
voice will be heard in national elections, it is possible that poor economic 
conditions might motivate citizens to turn up at the polls to try to improve 
political conditions and, by extension, their economic circumstances. Because 
the elections in our dataset are defined by Freedom House as at least “partly 
free,” we believe that this second logic is the most relevant for this study.
The first economic variable we test is Gross National Income Per Capita, 
or the total income of resident producers divided by the mid-year population. 
We also check growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is intended 
to capture changing economic conditions in a country. On both economic 
indicators, Singapore performs best and Indonesia the worst. We also test infant 
mortality and life expectancy rates as surrogates for economic development. 
Higher infant mortality and lower life expectancy are believed to equate with 
less development and poorer economic conditions. In our database, Indonesia 
has the highest infant mortality and lowest life expectancy rates, while 
Singapore has the lowest infant mortality and highest life expectancy rates.
Results
An appendix provides t-tests of the difference in mean voter turnout in the 
nineteen elections employed in this analysis when certain electoral-institutional 
arrangements are present versus when they are absent. When the independent 
variables or alternative explanations are represented by ordinal or ratio data, 
we report bivariate correlations with voter turnout in the nineteen elections. 
The information from the appendix is then condensed in tables 2 through 5. In 
each of the tables, the countries are ranked by average voter turnout in the time 
period studied. Hence, in each table, the far left column shows the countries 
in the same order. Indonesia has the highest average voter turnout, Thailand 
is second, the Philippines third, Malaysia fourth, and Singapore last. Table 
2 shows the relationship between average voter turnout and whether each 
Table 2. Electoral Institutions and Turnout of Voting-Age Populations in the 
Democratizing Countries of Southeast Asia, 1998-2011
Country Turnout
Rest-Day 
Voting
Concurrent 
Elections
Unicameral 
Legislature
Mandatory 
Voting
Automatic 
Registration
Indonesia 81.9 No No Part No Yes
Thailand 69.7 Yes No No Yes No
Philippines 65.0 No Yes No No No
Malaysia 51.8 No No No No No
Singapore 36.9 Yes No Yes Yes No
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Table 3. Demographics and Turnout of Voting-Age Populations in the 
Democratizing Countries of Southeast Asia, 1998-2011
Country Turnout
Female 
Literacy
Urbanization
Size of Largest 
Ethnic Group
Size of Largest 
Religious Group
Indonesia 81.9 4 4 4 2
Thailand 69.7 2 5 2 1
Philippines 65.0 1 3 5 3
Malaysia 51.8 5 2 3 4
Singapore 36.9 3 1 1 5
country has certain electoral institutional arrangements that are believed to 
cause higher electoral participation. The table simply states “yes” or “no” if 
the country has rest-day voting, concurrent elections, a unicameral legislature, 
mandatory voting, or automatic registration. If these variables influence voter 
turnout, we would expect the “yes’s” to be amassed at the top of the table and the 
“no’s” at the bottom. Note, of the five different considerations, only automatic 
registration exhibits this pattern. Indonesia has automatic voter registration and 
the highest average voter turnout. None of the other institutional considerations 
lines up with expectations.
Considering table 3 and demographic considerations, there is also limited 
evidence of the hypothesized relationships. In this table, the columns to the 
right of the “Turnout” column present the countries’ relative ranks when 
compared to each other on the different demographic considerations that might 
be expected to be associated with varying levels of voter turnout. In order 
to affirm the hypothesized relationships about demographic considerations, 
smaller numbers (1 and 2) should be at the top of the table and the fourth- and 
fifth-ranked countries should be at the bottom of the table.
Note, first, expectations regarding urbanization are not met in large part 
because the most urbanized nation-state, Singapore, has the lowest voter 
turnout. Moreover, we expected higher female literacy to be associated with 
higher voter turnout, and this is not the case. Indonesia, the country with 
the highest voter turnout, has only the fourth highest female literacy rate. 
There is some evidence of possible ethnic mobilization. The most ethnically 
diverse populations (Indonesia and the Philippines) have the first and third 
highest levels of voter turnout, and the most ethnically homogeneous country 
(Singapore) has the lowest voter turnout rate. Our expectations about religious 
heterogeneity increasing voter turnout are not met.
When we consider the quality of democracy indicators in the five Southeast 
Asian countries, we begin to see more orderly effects (table 4). Indonesia, with 
the highest voter turnout, is ranked either first or second on the four different 
measures of democratic development. Singapore, with the lowest voter turnout, 
is ranked either fourth or last on each indicator. Also, Malaysia with relatively 
low average voter turnout, does not score high on the alternative indicators 
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of democratic quality, consistent with expectations. The relationship between 
democratic development and voter turnout, however, is not a perfect match, 
as the Philippines, with a relatively high-quality formal democracy, is ranked 
only third in terms of voter turnout. More discussion about the relationship 
between formal democratic quality and voter turnout is offered below.
Our last set of indicators measures the economic well-being of the five 
countries. In this instance, our hypotheses suggest an inverted ranking. In other 
words, if poor economic conditions motivate people to participate in politics, 
we would expect higher numbers (or lower rankings) to congregate at the top 
of table 5 and lower numbers to appear at the bottom of the table. Indeed, this 
is what we find. Singapore, with a relatively strong economic performance, is 
associated with lower voter mobilization, and Indonesia, which ranks lowest in 
all measures of economic well-being, has the highest voter turnout. Moreover, 
the results from Malaysia are in tune with our expectations. Malaysia has the 
second best economic conditions and the second lowest average voter turnout, 
suggesting that economic well-being may keep people home on Election Day. 
The Philippines and Thailand flip-flop positions to some degree, but basically 
each of these two countries has a lower performing economy and a higher 
voter turnout level, suggesting that economic hardships may be driving people 
to the polls as hypothesized.
Table 4. Quality of Democracy and Turnout of Voting-Age Populations in the 
Democratizing Countries of Southeast Asia, 1998-2011
Country Turnout
Freedom House 
Civil Liberties
Freedom House 
Political Rights
Freedom House 
Combined Scores
Polity 
Scores
Indonesia 81.9 2 1 1 2
Thailand 69.7 3 4 3 4
Philippines 65.0 1 2 2 1
Malaysia 51.8 4-5 3 4 3
Singapore 36.9 4-5 5 5 5
Table 5. Economic Well-Being and Turnout of Voting-Age Populations in the 
Democratizing Countries of Southeast Asia, 1998-2011
Country Turnout
Gross National Income 
Per Capita
Growth in Gross
Domestic Product
Infant 
Mortality
Life 
Expectancy
Indonesia 81.9 5 5 5 5
Thailand 69.7 3 4 4 3
Philippines 65.0 4 3 3 4
Malaysia 51.8 2 2 2 2
Singapore 36.9 1 1 1 1
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We perform one last test. Given our findings regarding the quality of 
democracy and economic well-being indicators, we tested an interaction 
effect. Specifically, we imagined that it might be a combination of quality 
democracy and poor economic conditions that best predicts voter turnout in 
our five countries. Each country in the dataset is represented by a minimum 
of three parliamentary elections and we have unique “quality of democracy” 
and “economic well-being” scores for each election in each country in the 
study. We multiply the values for democratic well-being (using the combined 
Freedom House score) and GDP growth (a classic measure of economic well-
being) for all nineteen observations and next create country averages. The 
country values are then standardized and subsequently averaged, as are the 
voter turnout values, so that we can display the data in the same figure.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between better democratic conditions 
interacting with poorer economic situations and voter turnout. Now, there is 
a perfect match. Previous research has pointed to this possibility. In work on 
the United States, it has been found that “those facing economic adversity 
are more likely to vote when they [can] blame the government for economic 
outcomes.”36 Being able to “blame” the government suggests the governing 
system is at least minimally liable or that the country enjoys an appropriate 
Figure 1. The Relationship between Voter Turnout and the Combined 
Freedom House Score and Lower Growth in State Gross Domestic Product
Note:  For this figure, we use standardized values plus 2 or ∑((xi – mean)/s.d. + 2)/n. Moreover, 
to preserve the substantive significance of all values, we reverse the values of the Freedom 
House Scores and GDP Growth so that more freedom (better quality democracy) and lower 
GDP growth (worse economic conditions) produce positive standardized values.
36 Kevin Arceneaux, “The Conditional Impact of Blame Attribution on the Relationship between 
Economic Adversity and Turnout,” Political Research Quarterly 56, no. 1 (2003): 67-75.
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level of democratic accountability. Other work considering consolidated 
democracies suggests that poor economic conditions may cause voters to 
withdraw from electoral participation.37 However, when scholars turn their 
attention to the developing world, they find “economic downturns elevate 
turnout while upswings depress it.”38 One can reasonably assume that findings 
regarding the developing world are most relevant for our purposes and even 
more germane when elections matter or when the quality of democracy is 
sufficient enough that elected officials are answerable to the voting public.
In all, our preliminary work suggests that when people are hungry 
(figuratively or literally perhaps) and there is higher quality formal democracy, 
as is the case in Indonesia, there is higher voter turnout. Conversely, when 
people are economically comfortable and the quality of democracy is such that 
people do not have much faith that their vote matters, as arguably may occur in 
Singapore, voter turnout is lower. Indeed, the interaction of quality democracy 
and poor economic conditions produces a perfectly predictable relationship 
with voter turnout in the five countries studied, as exhibited in figure 1.
Qualification of Results
Our base empirical analysis, although illuminating for an initial probe, leaves 
many questions about citizen participation in the democratizing countries of 
Southeast Asia unanswered. For instance, there are several possibilities as 
to why our research fails to confirm the hypotheses about the influence of 
institutional variables on voter turnout.
Considering concurrent elections, it may simply be that we do not detect an 
influence on voter turnout in the Philippines because it is the only country with 
such a system in the region. This makes a meaningful comparison with other 
Southeast Asian countries difficult. Yet, we can note that, although legislative 
and executive elections are not concurrent in Indonesia, a law adopted prior 
to the 2004 and 2009 elections requires a certain number of seats, or vote 
percentage, to be earned by a party or a coalition of parties for qualification 
to nominate a presidential candidate.39 The legislative elections held in April 
2004 and 2009, respectively, determined whether the party or the coalition 
of parties could run a candidate in the presidential elections, which followed 
in July. Hence, in some sense, legislative and executive elections were held 
37 Steven J. Rosenstone, “Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout,” American Journal of Political 
Science 26, no. 1 (1982): 25-46.
38 Alexander Pacek and Benjamin Radcliff, “The Political Economy of Competitive Elections 
in the Developing World,” American Journal of Political Science 39, no. 3 (1995): 745-759; 
see also, Benjamin Radcliff, “The Welfare State, Turnout, and the Economy: A Comparative 
Analysis,” American Political Science Review 86 (1992): 444-456.
39 Andreas Ufen, “The Legislative and Presidential Elections in Indoniesia in 2009,” Electoral 
Studies 29, no. 2 (2010): 281-285.
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“concurrently” and we cannot rule out the possibility that this may have caused 
higher voter turnout in Indonesia, the country with the highest level of turnout 
in the study.
We also could not confirm a relationship between the presence of 
unicameral legislatures and voter turnout. Voter turnout actually increased 
in Indonesia after the unicameral legislature was abolished in 2001 and the 
Regional Representatives Council (Upper Chamber) was established. We feel 
that this finding needs to be qualified. The Indonesian Regional Representatives 
Council does not have the revising power of a typical Upper Chamber and 
has only a consultative role in matters concerning center-periphery relations.40 
Moreover, candidates who want to be elected to the Council must not belong 
to a political party. A 2004 survey revealed that 42 percent of Indonesian voters 
were either unaware of the Regional Representative Council’s existence or did 
not know how to elect its members.41 Hence, it might be said that the bicameral 
elections of 2004 and 2009 continued to act as unicameral elections in voters’ 
minds.
Moreover, we think that unicameralism probably did not influence voter 
turnout in Singapore because voters in that country are acutely aware that 
opposition parties have no chance of winning a majority or even a plurality 
of the seats in the national legislature. In Singapore, the opposition never 
managed to occupy more than two seats in parliament between 1981 and 2011. 
Since 2011, opposition parties have controlled six seats but the People’s Action 
Party (PAP) still controls eighty-one of the eighty-seven seats. Since there is 
no real possibility to change the composition of the parliament, unicameralism 
may have a negligible effect on voter turnout in the city-state.
We also wish to qualify our results regarding mandatory voting. Singapore 
and Thailand have such regulations, but these countries have relatively low 
voter turnout. This may be explained, in part, by the type of sanction that occurs 
for nonvoting in Singapore. Singaporeans who fail to vote are deleted from the 
electoral registry. Citizens can apply to be reinstated, but have to pay a fine if 
they cannot present good cause for why they abstained from voting.42 We think 
that mandatory voting regulations in Singapore do not produce greater turnout 
of the voting-age population because the nature of the sanction complicates 
matters. Mandatory voting regulations may have actually caused lower voter 
turnout in Singapore by shrinking the number of registered voters, which 
lowers turnout of the voting-age population. Put differently, if the sanction 
prevents people from registering to vote, turnout of the “eligible” voting-age 
population would necessarily be lower.
40 Roland Rich, “Designing the DPD: Indonesia’s Regional Representative Council,” Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies 47, no. 2 (2011): 263-272.
41 Chanintira Thalang, “The Legislative Elections in Indonesia, April 2004,” Electoral Studies 24, 
no. 2 (2005): 326-332.
42 Chin, “The General Election in Singapore, May 2006.”
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Regarding mandatory voting in Thailand, citizens who fail to vote without 
notifying the election commission lose their right to run as a candidate in local 
and national elections until they cast their ballot in a future election.43 However, 
around 90 percent of citizens are unable to run as candidates anyway, because 
they do not meet educational and other requirements. Contrary to the research 
cited earlier which found that the type of sanction for not voting does not 
matter, others who study Southeast Asia have noted specifically that since “the 
penalties for abstention are minor...turnouts [in Thailand] are typically closer 
to those seen in non-compulsory voting systems.”44
Our research also failed to produce a strong pattern of invariant associations 
between demographic variables and voter turnout. For instance, the state with 
the highest urbanization, Singapore, also had the lowest voter turnout. We think 
this has to do with the fact that urbanization in Singapore over past decades 
has first and foremost followed political imperatives. Concretely, “compulsory 
urban resettlement provided the PAP [the dominant party] with the opportunity 
of breaking up established and potential electoral communities by dividing 
up old ethnic, working-class communities for resettlement in dispersed 
locations.”45 Resettlement, with the provision of public housing to around 
86 percent of the population, is arguably the government’s most successful 
attempt at social control.46 In short, Singapore’s urban population has been 
fractionalized in a manner that may depress voter mobilization, suggesting any 
direct effect on voter turnout is not a straightforward proposition.
Likewise, our expectations about ethnic and religious heterogeneity 
and voter turnout were not firmly met. Higher ethnic fragmentation was 
moderately associated with higher turnout, while religious fragmentation had 
no relationship to voter turnout. We believe the reason for the weak association 
between fragmentation and voter turnout is because voter mobilization along 
ethnic lines is rare in the five countries studied. For instance, Indonesia, the most 
ethnically fragmented country of the five cases, has no ethnic-based parties, 
which might serve as mobilizing agents. Indeed, scholars have described the 
country as a “weakly ethnicized polity.”47 The same is true for politics in 
43 Aurel Croissant and Daniel Pojar, “The Parliamentary Election in Thailand, February 2005,” 
Electoral Studies 25, no. 1 (2006):184-191, and Christian Schafferer, “The Parliamentary 
Election in Thailand, December 2007,” Electoral Studies 28, no. 1 (2009): 167-170.
44 In Thailand’s 2007 elections, abstention was highest in the poor northeastern provinces. 
Thailand’s ballots include a “no desire to vote” option. In 2007, around 3 percent of the valid 
votes were such votes compared to 37.9 percent in the 2006 elections, which were later annulled 
(Schafferer, “The Parliamentary Election in Thailand, December 2007,” 167-169).
45 Linda Lim, Status of Women in Asia and the Pacific Region (New York: UN Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 1989).
46 Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control of Singapore (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994).
47 Edward Aspinall, “Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses,” Journal of 
East Asian Studies 11, no. 2 (2011): 289-319.
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the Philippines, where parties often try to broaden their electoral appeal by 
deliberately nominating candidates with different ethnic origins. Malaysia is 
the only country examined where ethnic-based parties are significant political 
players. However, a cross-ethnic alliance, the Barisan Nasional, has run the 
country’s politics in a consociationalist fashion for decades. Arguably, the 
complex political dynamics that arise from this arrangement have prevented 
ethnic fragmentation from having an influence on voter turnout in Malaysia.48
Similar dynamics may be at play with regard to religious fragmentation. The 
multireligious ruling coalitions in both Malaysia and Singapore share similar 
political and economic interests. We speculate that the power and financial 
interests concentrated in the one-party system in Singapore and the dominant-
party system in Malaysia trump religious fragmentation. In the Philippines, 
religious fragmentation is geographically confined to the south of the country 
as is the case in Thailand. The majority of the electorate is therefore not 
exposed to political dynamics related to religious diversity49 and voter turnout 
does not seem to be affected. In Indonesia, parties with religious platforms that 
have entered politics have not fared well. Consequently, these groups have 
toned down their religious messages.50 In short, we believe political realities 
in the five countries studied prevent religious or ethnic diversity from having 
the expected influence on voter turnout.
We found an overall positive relationship between formal democratic 
quality and voter turnout. Indonesia, the country that scored either first or 
second on all of the quality of democracy indicators also had the highest voter 
turnout. Turnout and democratic quality are also higher in the Philippines and 
Thailand. One could attribute these results to voters’ stance vis-à-vis democracy. 
Voters in these countries, in other words, cherish and value their democratic 
freedoms and make frequent use of them to express their political preferences. 
Indeed, surveys conducted in recent years show that Indonesian citizens show 
continuously strong support for the newly established democratic institutions, 
despite the questionable behavior of many of their politicians.51
Last, our finding that economic well-being predicts voter turnout is 
supported by corollary evidence from previous studies. For instance, changes 
in the popularity of Indonesia’s president Yudhoyono have been closely tied to 
48 Chin-Huat Wong, “The Federal and State Elections in Malaysia, March 2004,” Electoral Studies 
24, no. 2 (2005): 311-319.
49 Vince Boudreau, “Elections, Repression and Authoritarian Survival in Post-Transition Indonesia 
and the Philippines,” Pacific Review 22, no. 2 (2009): 233-253.
50 Michael Buehler, “Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized 
Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party,” Party Politics 19, no. 2 
(2013): 210-229.
51 Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia and the Pitfalls of Low-Quality Democracy: A Case Study of the 
Gubernatorial Elections in North Sulawesi,” in Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. 
Marco Bunte and Andreas Ufen (London: Routledge Press, 2011), 124-149.
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the fluctuation in domestic oil and gas prices. The massive subsidy programs 
established during Yudhoyono’s two tenures are indicative of how politicians 
have started to realize their political survival may be tied to voters’ economic 
well-being.52 Likewise, record turnout figures and the electoral success of 
Thaksin Shinawatra who was prime minister of Thailand between 2001 and 
2006 before being overthrown in a military coup, are primarily due to Thaksin’s 
pro-poor policies.53 These earlier works compliment the relationship between 
economic conditions and voter turnout uncovered by this research. Moreover, 
they speak to possible democratic accountability. Poorer economic conditions 
increase nonelite (poorer citizens) voter turnout, which prompts politicians to 
take notice and respond with policies that aim at the poor. The precise causal 
string is, at minimum, theoretically plausible.
Conversely, citizens in Malaysia and Singapore, more affluent on average, 
turn out to vote at lower rates. Again, findings from previous studies compliment 
the results of our systematic comparison. The continuing economic growth in 
Singapore provides the government with a great degree of legitimacy. And, 
“economic development in Singapore is not accompanied by widespread calls 
for greater political openness and transparency.”54 It seems economic well-
being forestalls public demand for decentralization of political authority in a 
manner consistent with higher levels of citizen participation. In Malaysia, too, 
consistent economic growth over past decades may be preventing some voters 
from recognizing a need to turn out on Election Day.55
Avenues for Future Research
The qualitative probing of the results of our base quantitative analysis has largely 
corroborated our findings regarding democratic development and economic 
conditions. But, the investigation has also uncovered other possible explanations 
for varying levels of voter turnout, based on institutional and demographic 
considerations that our tests failed to expose. The incomplete nature of our 
numerical tests must be acknowledged. Cross-national comparisons of the type 
employed here are wrought with inference problems that result from cultural 
distinctiveness and nonsystematic “real-world” conditions. The net result often 
is, simply, avenues for future research.
52 Michael Buehler, Vested Interests Impede Subsidy Reform in Indonesia (Oxford: Oxford 
Analytica, 2011).
53 Croissant and Pojar, “The Parliamentary Election in Thailand, February 2005,” and Schafferer, 
“The Parliamentary Election in Thailand, December 2007.”
54 Chin, “The General Election in Singapore, May 2006.”
55 For evidence of this phenomenon in other developing countries, see Radcliff, “The Welfare 
State, Turnout, and the Economy.”
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For instance, in Singapore, we learn that it is almost certainly the case that 
voter turnout has fluctuated based on the number of constituencies contested. 
There were more constituencies contested in 2006 than in 2001, which 
arguably explains why voter turnout went from 21.4 percent to 32.2 percent of 
the voting-age population. Opposition parties contested only twenty-nine seats 
in the 2001 elections but forty-seven seats in the 2006 elections. In 2011, the 
opposition put up candidates for eighty-two of eighty-seven seats in parliament 
and the average voter turnout in 2011 rose to a record level (53.3 percent). In 
short, the possibility of political change in certain Singaporean constituencies 
may explain variance in voter turnout in the island nation.
Second, there may be an alternative explanation altogether for voter 
turnout in the formally high-quality democracies of Southeast Asia that are 
also poor. Paradoxically, the three countries with the highest turnout figures are 
also the ones most devoid of programmatic politics. Especially in Indonesia 
and the Philippines, politicians rarely campaign on ideas or by using policy 
programs.56 Parties are almost always the personal vehicles of politicians 
whose main interest in politics is to protect or improve their personal economic 
well-being.57 In addition to the absence of meaningful political platforms, these 
electoral contests are highly “elitist” affairs.58
In the context of the nonprogrammatic and elitist character of elections 
in these countries, we need to know more about why a combination of low 
economic well-being and relatively strong formal civil and political liberties 
motivates voters to cast their ballot. For instance, why do voters in poor 
democracies turn out in high numbers when the opportunities of electing a 
parliament composed of alternative figures may be absent? At the same time, do 
voters see elections as a referendum for the performance of past parliaments? 
Do they give salience to sociotropic over pocketbook considerations when 
turning out to vote? How would voters make such decisions, anyway, given the 
almost complete absence of meaningful discourse prior to, during, and after 
elections about the economic performance and the quality of services delivered 
by politicians?
The fact that programmatic politics are least pronounced in the democracies 
of Southeast Asia that also show the highest levels of voter participation 
56 Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of 
the Party System,” Lowy Institute for International Policy 19 (May 2009): 3-22, and Mark R. 
Thompson, “Class, Charisma, and Clientelism,” in Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism 
and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, ed. Dirk Tomsa and 
Andreas Ufen (New York: Routledge, 2012): 62-79.
57 For an in-depth case study from Indonesia, see Michael Buehler and Paige Tan, “Party-Candidate 
Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in 
Gowa, South Sulawesi Province,” Indonesia 84 (2007): 41-69.
58 In Thailand, for example, the requirements for citizens who want to participate in elections as 
candidates, such as the possession of a bachelor’s degree, disqualifies around 90 percent of the 
population from running for parliament.
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suggests looking for alternative explanations for the relationship between 
turnout and formal democracy in combination with lower economic well-being. 
We think that differentiating between substantive and procedural democratic 
qualities may offer some insights. A small but growing body of literature has 
started to challenge the assumption that electoral participation can be used as a 
democratic proxy.59 High electoral turnout in Russia, for instance, may not be 
indicative of an active electorate but, rather, of bad or corrupt record keeping.60 
Other scholars have suggested that coercive voter mobilization and outright 
fraud may explain high voter turnout in poor democracies.61
Most specifically, we think, the influence of political corruption needs to be 
taken into account as a potential explanation for variance in voter turnout rates 
in the countries of Southeast Asia. The three countries with the highest voter 
turnout, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, figure high on the quality of 
democracy index because formal institutions associated with democracy are in 
place. However, many of these institutions are dysfunctional and are ignored 
in favor of informal political mechanisms. Hence, higher voter turnout may 
simply be an effect of vote-buying and other forms of political corruption. 
Against this backdrop, we believe that future research needs to focus on the 
complex dynamics of political malfeasance and its influence on electoral 
participation. Let this essay be the opening salvo for a much-needed discussion 
about what drives voter turnout in democratizing Southeast Asia.
59 Caroline Beer and Neil J. Mitchell, “Comparing Nations and States: Human Rights and 
Democracy in India,” Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 8 (2006): 996-1018; Michael 
Coppedge, “Defining and Measuring Democracy,” paper presented at the Interantional Political 
Science Association, Mexico City, Mexico, 2005; and Tomila Lankina and Lullit Getachew, 
“Mission or Empire, Word or Sword? Colonial-Era Education Legacy in India’s Democratic 
Development,” paper presented at the Second International Symposium of Comparative 
Research on Major Regional Powers in Eurasia, Tokyo and Osaka, Japan, 2010.
60 Joseph Deckert and Mikhail Myagkov, “How Are Elections Fixed? An Agent-Based Model of 
Russia’s Regional Politics,” paper presented at the Annual Convention and Exhibition of the 
American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2010.
61 Byron Moraski and William M. Reisinger, “Explaining Electoral Competition across Russia’s 
Regions,” Slavic Review 62, no. 2 (2003): 278-301.
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Appendix
Statistical Relationships among Variables Hypothesized to Influence Voter 
Turnout in Democratizing Southeast Asia, 1998-2011
Variables
Expected 
Sign
Statistical 
Relationship
Sample 
Size
Electoral-Institution Considerations
Difference of 
Means Test
Rest-Day Voting + t = -1.23 19
Concurrent Elections + t = .75 19
Unicameral Legislature + t = -2.10 # 19
Mandatory Voting + t = -1.23 19
Automatic Registration + t = 2.62 ** 19
Demographic Considerations
Bivariate 
Correlations
Female Literacy + r = .16 19
Urbanization + r = -.82 # 19
Size of Largest Ethnic Group - r = -.35 t 19
Size of Largest Religious Group - r = .81 # 19
Quality of Democracy Considerations
Bivariate 
Correlations
Freedom House Civil Liberties
(higher score means less free)
- r = -.56 ** 19
Freedom House Political Rights
(higher score means less free)
- r = -.43 * 19
Freedom House Combined Scores
(higher score means less free)
- r = -.50 * 19
Polity Scores
(lower score means less democracy)
+ r = .55 ** 19
Economic Considerations
Bivariate 
Correlations
Gross National Income Per Capita - r = -.64 ** 19
Growth in Gross Domestic Product - r = -.37 t 19
Infant Mortality + r = .84 *** 19
Life Expectancy - r = -.77 *** 19
Note:  Results based on the following elections: Indonesia (1999, 2004, 2009); Malaysia (1999, 
2004, 2008); Philippines (1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010); Singapore (2001, 2006, 2011); 
and Thailand (2001, 2005, 2006, 2007).
*** p < .01; ** p < .01; p < .05; t p < .10 (one-tailed tests).
# Statistically significant in the hypothesized wrong direction.
